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PATENT TERM EXTENSION OF PHARMACEUTICALS IN
JAPAN: SO YOU SAY YOU WANT TO RUSH THAT
GENERIC DRUG TO MARKET IN JAPAN .... GOOD LUCK!
William T. Christiansen III
Abstract: With the passage of the Drug Price Competition Act of 1984 in the United States, the
recent German Supreme Court decision allowing for experimental use of patented pharmaceuticals, and
indirectly through the adoption of the Supplemental Protection Certificate in Europe, Japan seems to be the
lone large pharmaceutical market which does not allow in some way for the experimental use of patented
drugs to gain regulatory approval for a generic equivalent. Japanese generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
had, until recently, operated under the assumption that the testing of a generic equivalent to a patented drug
to gain regulatory approval was allowable as long as the drug was not marketed until after the patent had
expired. This assumption proved incorrect in a recent Nagoya District Court decision, which essentially
relied on the logic of an earlier decision to find that pre-patent experimental use for commercial
exploitation is not allowable under the Japanese Patent Law. However, with Japan's society graying more
rapidly than many other industrialized nations, the Ministry of Health and Welfare has taken a hard look at
generic pharmaceuticals as a mechanism for reducing health-care costs. The favorable view that generic
pharmaceuticals are receiving from the Ministry of Health and Welfare combined with the move toward
greater transparency between the government and industry leads to the logical conclusion that the Ministry
of Health and Welfare, through the Diet, will likely propose a change to the Japanese Patent Law which
would allow for the pre-patent expiry testing of generic pharmaceutical equivalents. While there are
drawbacks to such an experimental use doctrine, the long term benefits are many. From helping a Yen-
conscious government reduce health-care costs to bolstering domestic pharmaceutical innovation by
fostering greater competition, an experimental use allowance for generic pharmaceuticals is right for Japan.
I. INTRODUCTION
As we move toward the age of a more global economy and
technologically dependent society, intellectual property rights are becoming
of paramount importance. Specifically, the patent protection afforded
pharmaceuticals has a serious effect on the pharmaceutical market and
innovation. A recent study has demonstrated the importance of adequate
patent protection in finding that the average new drug costs approximately
$231 million to bring from discovery through approval by the United States
Food and Drug Administration.' Additionally, it typically takes an average
of twelve years, from discovery to regulatory approval, to bring a new drug
to market.2 Thus, if drug manufacturers perceive patent rights to be weak in
t Ph.D. in Biochemistry/Biophysics and Molecular Biology 1995, University of Notre Dame.
American Bar Association, 1993-94 A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. LAW REP. 63. See also PMA,
FDA Team Up on Orphan Drug Act 241, 10 CHEM. MKT. REP. 3, 15 (Mar. 1992).
2 Id.
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a country, then pharmaceutical innovation will be severely hindered.3
Perceiving a potential detrimental affect on the market, most industrialized
nations have declined to allow generic manufacturers to test generic
versions of patented drugs, before the patent expiry, in order to meet
mandated regulatory approval guidelines.
While clinical studies done with patented pharmaceuticals aimed at
expediting the introduction of generic versions of those same
pharmaceuticals have, in the past, been held to infringe the name-brand drug
manufacturer's patent, almost everywhere in the industrialized world,
recently countries have reassessed this stand. During this period of
reassessment, the economics of the pharmaceutical industry have played a
considerable role. In most countries the decision to allow experimental use
has only been agreed upon when there is also a period of patent term
extension allowed for name-brand manufacturers. However, economics
dictate that entry of a generic competitor must begin before the name-brand
product's growth has slowed to such a low level that no generic producer
could secure a return from manufacturing the drug.5
When the Nagoya District Court, on March 6, 1996, found
experimental use by a generic manufacturer to obtain data to submit for
regulatory approval to constitute infringement of the name-brand drug
manufacturer's patent, it sent shockwaves through Japan's generic industry
and also set in motion a flurry of similar infringement actions.6 However,
Japan's Ministry of Health and Welfare has indicated its willingness to
embrace generics as a method for reducing the health-care costs it must pay
for a steadily graying society.7 With the recent move toward greater
transparency (i.e. greater clarity of the separation between industry and
government) between industry and government' combined with the desire to
' OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 89-93 (Bart
Brown, ed. 1991) (OTA-BA-494) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
4 David Gilat, Experimental Use and Patents, 16 IIC STUD. 31, 32 (1996).
s James J. Wheaton, Generic Competition and Pharmaceutical Innovation: The Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433,470-71 (1986).
6 Judgment of Nagoya District Court March 6, 1996 (Unpublished Opinion) [hereinafter Nagoya
District Court Decision]. A summary is reported in CHITEKI ZAISANKEN HANKETSU SOKUHO (May 20,
1996).
7 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches: Several Japanese Makers of Generic Medicines
Sued Over Alleged Violations, NIKKEI WEEKLY, June 24, 1996, at 9, available in LEXIS, Asiapc library,
NIKKEI File. See also Brian Mertens, Pharmaceuticals: Japan Heads into an Industry Shakeout, AM.
CHAMBER OF COM. IN JAPAN J., Aug. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11700040.
1 Japan's Drug Approval System to be Reformed, MARKETLETTER (UK), Sept. 9, 1996, available in
1996 WL 10714942.
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reduce state reimbursed health-care costs,9 Japan must balance the interests
of its name-brand pharmaceutical industry in promoting innovation through
an incentives policy with that of the generic industry which seeks to
decrease overall drug costs. To do this, the current patent law of Japan
already has a liberal term extension provision, but requires a clearer
experimental use provision.
This Comment explores in the following section the current status of
the law regarding experimental use of patented pharmaceuticals by generic
manufacturers in the United States, Japan, and the European Economic
Community. Part III evaluates the likelihood that Japan will change its
current law on experimental use after examining advantages and
disadvantages to such a change. Part IV discusses the ways in which
change to the current law could be effectuated and how that change would
likely occur. This Comment concludes that when change does occur it will
be spearheaded by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in an effort to reduce
health-care costs and with the additional goal of harmonizing Japan's
experimental use exception with that of the United States and the European
Community.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Brief Introduction to the Policies Behind the US. and Japanese
Patent Systems
At the outset it should be noted that the policies which define patent
use and protection in the United States diverge substantially from those in
Japan.' 0 While the Japanese system is designed to promote technological
development by disseminating technology to industry, the U.S. patent
policy seeks to promote technological development by awarding individual
patentees exclusive rights to their inventions." The focus of the Japanese
law is spelled out clearly in section 1 of the Japanese Patent Law, which
states, "The purpose of this Law shall be to encourage inventions by
promoting their protection and utilization so as to contribute to the
9 Brian C. Cunningham & Joyce C. Chow, The Biotechnology Industry in Japan: A Framework for
Entry, 4(7) J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 13 (July 1992).
to Stephen Lesavich, The New Japan-U.S. Patent Agreements: Will They Really Protect US. Patent
Interests in Japan?, 14 WiS. INT'L L. J. 155, 162 (1995).
i Id.
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development of industry."'12 Thus, the differing philosophies behind the
patent laws of the United States and Japan have led to the development of
very different patent systems.' 3  This difference is exemplified by
comparing the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
with the Japanese equivalents, namely section 67(2) and section 69(1) of the
Japanese Patent Law.'4
B. History of the US. Act
In 1984, the United States Congress passed the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act ("DPA")(also known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act for the Congressmen who sponsored the bill).' The
passage of this act was the result of lobbying efforts of both the
pharmaceutical industry as well as consumer interest groups.' 6 The passage
of the DPA had the result of overruling Roche v. Bolar, in which the Federal
Circuit held that one company's use of another's patented drug to perform
the necessary tests to gain Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval
for marketing a generic version of the patented drug was an infringing use
under the patent statutes. 7 The goal of the pharmaceutical lobbyists was to
induce passage of a bill that would allow restoration of portions of the
patent life lost in the premarket regulatory review of new drug products
(e.g., FDA approval procedures). Competing with this objective was that of
the consumer groups which called for a quicker entry into the market for
generic drug manufacturers. 8
Senator Orrin Hatch, referring to the DPA, noted that it "represented
a finely tuned balance which reflected the dynamics of the healthcare
marketplace."' 19 He noted additionally that "on the one end was the need of
the innovator drug companies to rely on adequate intellectual property
2 Tokkyoh6 [PATENT L.] art. I (Japan), as translated in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY (1995) [hereinafter PATENT L.].
'3 Lesavich, supra note 10.
'4 PATENT L., supra note 12, at §§ 67(2) & 69(1).
" Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub.L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat.
1585.
16 See H.R. Rep. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 16-18 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2686.
'7 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 856 (1984).
" Wheaton, supra note 5, at 440.
Reginald Rhein, BIO, PhRMA Call For Longer Patent Lives to Make Up for FDA Review Lags,
BIOTECH. NEWSWATCH, Mar. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, BIOTEC file.
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protection to ensure that they attract sufficient capital for research and
development [while] on the other end were the fledgling generic drug
companies, who were not able to bring their products to market quickly
because of the FDA approval process and the patent law."2° The resulting
bill changed U.S. patent law and allowed for a patent term extension of up
to five years for qualifying pharmaceuticals. 2
Patent term extension is permitted for any drug product whose patent
has not expired, if a patent extension application has been submitted, if the
product was subject to regulatory review by a federal authority before the
product's commercial marketing or use, and if the commercial marketing or
use after the regulatory review period was the first marketing or use under
the law under which the regulatory review occurred.22 However, the
extension provision is limited. The sum of the amount of patent protection
left after regulatory review plus the patent extension can not exceed
fourteen years, with five years the maximum extension allowable.23
Additionally, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1) states that
[I]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United
States a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal Law which regulates the manufacture, use, or
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
This section has been further supported in a recent Federal Circuit decision
holding: "A generic drug manufacturer is not guilty of infringement by
filing an application for approval to engage in the commercial manufacture,
use, or sale of the drug before the expiration of the patent."24 Only the
patent term extension portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act is contained in the
analogous Japanese patent law.
20 Id
2 American Bar Association, supra note I.
22 35 U.S.C. § 156.
2 Id
24 Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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C. The Closest Japanese Patent Law Equivalent to the Hatch- Waxman
Act
The term extension allowed by Japanese law is set forth in section
67(2) of the Japanese Patent Law:
The term of the patent right may be extended, upon application
for registration of an extension, by a period not exceeding five
years if, because of the necessity of obtaining an approval or
other disposition which is governed by provisions in laws
intended to ensure safety, etc. in the working of the patented
invention, and which is provided for in a cabinet order as being
such that, in view of the object of the relevant disposition,
proceedings, etc., a considerable period of time is required for
proper action for the disposition, it was not possible to work
the patent invention for two years or more.25
This extension term allows protection of fifteen years from the date of
publication of the patent application, but not to exceed twenty years from
the filing date.26 Moreover, this patent term is further limited in that it
allows for a total market exclusivity of eighteen years for the drug.27
Additionally, the experimental use exception under Japanese Law is fairly
narrow, as section 69 indicates:
(1) The effects of the patent right shall not extend to the
working of the patent right for the purposes of experiment or
research.
(2) The effects of the patent right shall not extend to the
following:
(i) vessels or aircraft merely passing through Japan or
machinery, instruments, equipment or other accessories used
therein;
(ii) products existing in Japan prior to the filing of the patent
application.
25 PATENT L., supra note 12, at § 67(2).
26 Id. at § 67(l).
27 Edward H. Mazer, Supplementary Protection Certificates in the European Economic Community,
48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 571, 574 (1993).
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(3) The effects of the patent right for inventions of medicines
(namely, products used for the diagnosis, cure, medical
treatment or prevention of human diseases-hereinafter
referred to as "medicines" in this subsection) to be
manufactured by mixing two or more medicines or for
inventions of processes for manufacturing medicines by mixing
two or more medicines shall not extend to acts of preparing
medicines in accordance with the prescriptions of physicians or
dentists or to medicines prepared in accordance with the
prescriptions of physicians or dentists.2"
It appears from this section that only laboratory research and physicians
treating patients are exempt from patent infringement suits.
1. Japanese Court Decisions Relevant to Generic Drug Pre-Patent
Expiration Clinical Trials
While a literal reading of the statute does not indicate whether
experimental use like that of clinical trials is allowed, Japanese businesses
operated under this premise.29 Until March 1996, generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers had operated under the understanding that they could begin
clinical testing two to three years before the expiration date of the patent,
but were foreclosed from actually marketing until the patent expired.30 In
March 1996, the Nagoya District Court ruled that clinical testing of generic
copies of Synthelabo Groupe of France's patented hydrochloric-tiapride
medication before the patent expired constituted infringement. 3' Following
this decision a flurry of new lawsuits were filed by such giants as Bayer
AG 32  and Glaxo-Wellcome also alleging that certain Japanese
pharmaceutical manufacturers had infringed their patents by clinically
testing generic equivalents. 33
28 PATENT L., supra note 12, at art. 69.
Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches: Several Japanese Makers of Generic Medicines.
Sued Over Alleged Violations, supra note 7, at 9.
30 Id
" Nagoya District Court Decision, supra note 6.
32 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches: Several Japanese Makers of Generic Medicines
Sued Over Alleged Violations, supra note 7, at 9.
3" Glaxo Wellcome Sues 3 Generic Makers Here, COMLINE DAILY-NEWS BIOTECH. & MED. TECH.,
July 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, COMLNE File. See also Ono Suing 10 Foipan Generic
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Why generic manufacturers were previously under the belief that they
could use patented drugs for regulatory approval before expiration of the
patent seems unclear, but the most obvious basis is lack of enforcement.
The argument that the law in Japan has not changed recently in this regard
is supported by an older court ruling in Monsanto Company v. Stauffer
Japan KK.34  The Monsanto case was just one of a series in various
countries involving the use of a generic version of a herbicide to meet
regulatory approval for marketing after Monsanto's patent expired." In that
case the court noted that the legislative intent behind section 69 of the
Japanese Patent Law was that "experiments or research are inherently
intended to advance technology to the next stage and not for purposes
associated with the manufacture or marketing of a patented product., 36
Under this construction by the Tokyo District Court, it is unlikely that the
generic pharmaceutical companies had the legal view that clinical tests were
protected under the experimental use exception.
The rationale enunciated in the Tokyo District Court's decision in
Monsanto, as well as in the Nagoya District Court's decision in Synthelabo,
comports nicely with that of the law in many other countries including the
European Community ("EC") and the United States before the statutory
overruling of Bolar." The important difference between the U.S. and
Japanese laws in this regard are the protections afforded generic drug
manufacturers.
D. The EC Stance on Pre-Patent Expiration Experimental Use
Until recently it was clear that the EC used the experimental use
exception much the same way as articulated in Japan and as set forth in
Roche v. Bolar in the United States.38 The EC typically disallowed
arguments of experimental use when it appeared that the use was strictly
aimed at the commercial exploitation of the patented product. 39 As with the
Firms, COMLINE DAILY NEWS-BIOTECH. & MED. TECH., July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, COMLNE File.
34 The July 10, 1987 decision of the Tokyo District Court, 29th Civil Division, reported in 20 INT'L
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 91 (1989).
" See generally David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16
Hous. J. INT'L L. 615 (1994).
36 ld. at 653.
3'. See generally GILAT, supra note 4.
' ld. at 31-34.
I9 d. at 4.
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case of generic pharmaceuticals seeking approval before patent expiration,
the experimental use question presented in the Monsanto series of cases was
whether demonstrating to a third party (the regulatory agency of interest)
the efficacy with which one could duplicate the patented invention was
allowable under the current experimental use exception.40 As commentators
have noted, the state of the law in nearly all industrialized nations, before
the passage of the DPA in the United States, was that clinical trials for
merely a generic copy of a name-brand drug constituted infringement.4'
As Gilat points out, clinical trials conducted specifically for
demonstrating that a generic drug has the corresponding properties of the
patented drug "do not contribute to the promotion of progress., 42 However,
this commentator points out that "clinical trials conducted with a view to
establishing that a newly-developed drug has properties that are
advantageous over an existing patented drug do contribute to the promotion
of progress" and thus have been afforded experimental use protection.43
This basic premise of what is protected and what is not under the
Community Patent Convention is now on unstable ground due-to a recent
Federal Supreme Court decision in Germany.44
1. The Recent Decision by the German Supreme Court Moves the EC
Experimental Use Exception Closer to that of the United States.
Commentators have stated that "judging from the court decisions
over the last century, it is fair to say that a private defendant whose only
defense is the research exemption would do well to attempt to settle the case
out of court., 45 However, this premise may be changing based not only on
the DPA in the United States but also on the German Klinische Versuche
case reported by Kern.46 In that case the German Federal Supreme Court
analyzed the experimental use exception codified in section 11(2) of the
German Patent Act which is based on article 3 1(b) of the Community Patent
'0 Id. at 4 n.13.
" Id. at 65.
42 id.
43 Id. at 65-66.
BGH, 11 July, 1995, GRUR 1996, 109. See also Michael Kern, Recent Federal Supreme Court
Decisions on Experimental Use and Compulsory Licensing, 3 CASRIP NEWSLETrER (Center for the
Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual Property, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle,
WA) 8 (1996) (discussing the "Klinische Versuche" ruling).
" Kern, supra note 44.
46 Id.
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Convention (CPC 1975; now article 27(b) CPC 1989)."7 The Court found in
overturning the Dusseldorf Court of Appeals that "experiment" means "any
(systematic) action for obtaining knowledge, independent of the purpose for
which the new knowledge will ultimately be employed."48 The one caveat
to what appears to be a very broad rule is that the experimentation must be
directed towards the "subject matter of the patented invention., 49
While what is specifically meant by the phrase "subject matter of the
patented invention" cannot be clearly understood from the literal wording of
section 11(2), the Court tried to clarify, reasoning that a "natural" (or literal)
interpretation of the statute's wording indicated that all experimental uses
directed at gaining knowledge were exempt." Additionally, the Court noted
that section 11(2) does not literally limit experimental activities.5
Therefore the "legitimacy of the use cannot depend on whether the
experiments only relate to the analysis of the invention's alleged
characteristics or whether they focus on uncovering further research results
and concern an ulterior motive, e.g., commercial interests. ' 2 The Court
went on to note that the restrictive old German case law did not apply in this
case because section 11(2) was based on article 3 1(b) CPC.5 3
As the commentator reporting this case noted, "accordingly ... the
leading case under the former statute, 'Ethofumesate' gave no guidance,
how to decide the case under [§ 11(2)]."" 4 In the Ethofumesate case the
Court held that submitting an agent containing a patented substance to a
plant protection authority for regulatory approval while the patent was still
in effect infringes the patent.55 Moreover, this result was in accordance with
the pre-DPA law in the United States (even now this particular use would
not be experimental in the United States because the DPA does not include
an exception for agricultural chemicals) as well as that of other EC
countries and Japan (see, e.g., Monsanto v. Stauffer Japan K.K.). 56
41 Id. at 9.
49 id.
49 id.
50 Id.
31 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
14 Id. (discussing the Ethofumesate case), reported in 22 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT
541 (1991).
55 Id.
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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It is important to further examine the reasoning of this German case
since Japan typically follows the German lead in patent issues.57 Moreover,
patent harmonization is important between industrialized nations in this
technology-driven age. If this ruling of the German Supreme Court is
accepted in the rest of the EC, it would likely be a heavy influence on Japan
due to the allowance of similar experimental use in the United States.5 8 To
gain insight into the specific meaning of "relating to the subject matter of
the patented invention," in section 11(2) the Court looked at the legislative
materials of the CPC.59 After examining the CPC materials, the Court noted
that in reference to article 3 1 (b) the materials stated that patented substances
could be used for experimental purposes to assess such things as
"possibilities of application as well as further development."'6  Therefore,
the Court concluded that section 11(2) should not be restricted to the
functioning of the invention, but that the exception for experimental use
should cover more, e.g., "the development of specific applications." 61 The
Court also looked at the law in relation to the German Constitution and
noted that the public interest in the furtherance of technology demands that
clinical tests and experiments remain "privileged" under section 11(2), even
if this encumbers the patentee's rights.62
The Court discarded the distinction between commercial and purely
research uses to demarcate infringing from noninfringing uses. Instead, as
the commentator notes, the Court found:
For every grant of an experimental use exemption, it is also
irrelevant that the defendants intended to receive the health
authority's approval for their product and to exploit it
commercially. As [section] 11(2) exempts all acts from the
effects of a -patent that are done for experimental purposes
relating to the subject matter of the patented invention, the
permissibility of such experiments cannot be contingent on
" Interview with Toshiko Takenaka, Professor of Law at University of Washington School of Law,
in Seattle, Wash. (November 14, 1996) (discussing the influence of other countries patent laws on Japan).
See also TOSHIKO TAKENAKA, INTERPRETING PATENT CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY AND
JAPAN, 17 IIC STUD. 39-43 (1995).
" Interview with Toshiko Takenaka, supra note 57.
'9 Kern, supra note 44, at 10.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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what the purposes they are to achieve, be they pure scientific or
regulatory in nature.63
While Germany is a civil law country and thus the Supreme Court's
decisions are not absolutely binding on lower courts, nevertheless "the
Court seems indeed to have opened the floodgates with respect to clinical
experiments.
' 64
E. A Brief Note on Patent Extension in the EC
On July 2, 1992, the European Parliament enacted the supplementary
protection certificate ("SPC") legislation which was hailed as the most
significant development in patent law regarding pharmaceuticals in the EC
in recent years. 65 The goal of the SPC is to compensate the manufacturers
of pharmaceuticals for the reduction of effective patent life which is caused
by the delays of the regulatory approval process. 66 The SPC legislation
effectuates its goal by allowing market exclusivity, but not full patent rights,
during the extension period.67
Therefore, even if the German Supreme Court ruling is not strictly
followed in the EC, most pharmaceuticals will still be allowed to be tested
while the now patent-expired drug is covered by the SPC. The SPC
legislation seems on its face to achieve the same goals in one action that the
DPA does in two. Instead of allowing for both formal patent term extension
and clinical trials before the patent expires, the SPC allows generic drug
companies to conduct clinical trials following patent term expiration but
before SPC expiration.68 Since most important pharmaceuticals will be
subject to the use of an SPC, it is likely that the type of problem the
Japanese system poses (i.e., patent term extension with no allowance for
clinical trials until expiration) will happen only rarely. The SPC is similar
to the U.S. DPA in its protection aspects: there is a fifteen-year maximum
market exclusivity grant compared to fourteen in the U.S., and the
63 Id.
Id. at 11.
65 Trevor M. Cook, Pharmaceuticals and 1P in Europe, 23 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 15, 16 (1994),
available in LEXIS, Busfm Library, ABI File.
id.
67 Mazer, supra note 27, at 571.
6' Id. at 573.
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maximum SPC grant is for five years, the same as the maximum patent term
extension in the United States.69
With the assumption that most drugs will be covered by an SPC, it is
likely that generic drug manufacturers will be able to finish the required
abbreviated clinical trials during the SPC term. Thus the EC system will be
functionally identical with the U.S. system. The two systems will be fully
identical in this regard if the German Supreme Court decision sways the
other EC countries. Therefore, it seems that, in regard to the other major
high tech player, Japan, change in the allowance of experimental uses will
soon follow. This assumption is complex and definitely not assured, for
Japan may have other domestic needs that weigh the decision more heavily
in favor of keeping the current policy regarding the infringing nature of pre-
patent expiration clinical trials.
III. LIKELIHOOD OF CHANGE IN JAPANESE PATENT LAW
A. Advantages to Changing the Current Law
It is assumed in this section that the current law of Japan is reflected
by the Nagoya District Court decision finding clinical trials to be infringing
uses of the patented pharmaceutical.7" If, however, this turns out to not be
the case, these arguments are still useful in analyzing the differences
between systems which allow for these clinical trials compared to those that
do not. Generic manufacturers in Japan want to challenge the Nagoya Court
ruling, saying it is just a judicial precedent and cannot be generally
accepted. 71 This is a common argument put forth by generic manufacturers
in Japan and should be a motivating factor in changing the law back to the
common understanding before the ruling.
69 Id. at 574.
0 Nagoya District Court Decision, supra note 6.
7' Patent Disputes Seem Unavoidable for 70 Generic Drugs, COMLINE DAILY NEWS-
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, July 22, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
COMLNE File. It is important to remember that because Japan is a civil law country, its courts' rulings are
not necessarily binding precedent on other courts.
I
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1. Motivations Provided by Harmonization Efforts and the World
Market
The emphasis that industrialized nations have placed upon patent
harmonization through the Geneva Patent Harmonization Treaty, GATT-
TRIPS,72 and the recent International Conference on Harmonization of
Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use
("ICH") 73 are evidence that, in order to stay globally competitive in a high
technology age, a country needs to strike a balance between paternalism in
its domestic market and opening the domestic market to enhance
competition and induce outside investment. Additionally, the United States,
the EC, and Japan account for seventy-five percent of the world's
pharmaceutical market.74 Moreover, these countries make up ninety percent
of the world's pharmaceutical research.75 These facts alone make evident
the importance of harmonization amongst these countries. Moreover, as
Japanese companies look to penetrate global markets, technology transfer
agreements with the domestic pharmaceutical companies of other countries
become increasingly important.7 6 These domestic companies typically are
looking for reciprocal arrangements whereby they want to market a generic
drug in Japan.77 Without consistent regulations the domestic companies
will have some trepidation about entering into such an agreement with a
Japanese firm.
The pitfalls of inconsistent regulations in various countries were
addressed in an Office of Technology Assessment Report.78 This report
noted that the differing regulations and protections afforded
pharmaceuticals increase the costs for manufacturers as well as consumers
and cause significant delays in the introduction of new products.79  To
alleviate these problems, the United States, European Community, and
72 Akim F. Czmus, Biotechnology Protection in Japan, the European Community, and the United
States, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 435, 459 (1994).
73 Rosemarie Kanusky, Symposium: Intellectual Property: Comment: Pharmaceutical
Harmonization: Standardizing Regulations Among the United States, the European Economic Community,
and Japan, 16 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 665, 667 (1994).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 86.
77 Id.
79 Id.
79 Id. at 91.
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Japan signed a commitment to standardize pharmaceutical tests. 80 By
changing the law in Japan to reflect what appears to be the current law in
the European Community as well as the United States, the Japanese
government can more quickly harmonize their system with that of the other
major global competitors. Japan, with a thirty-one billion dollar
pharmaceutical market in 1989,81 is no minor player in the pharmaceutical
marketplace. In fact, Japan is second only to the United States in drug
consumption.82 In addition, the Japanese take twice the number of ethical
drugs83 as the typical American or European.84 Also, recent studies indicate
that by 2025 over thirty million people in Japan will be over sixty-five,
resulting in the highest ratio (one in four) of individuals over sixty-five to
the general population among industrialized nations. So it is no surprise
that the Japanese government would want the best, most cost-effective
pharmaceuticals available. 85 In order to achieve such a goal, regulatory
standardization is favored.86  Lastly, as evidence of the positive effect of
harmonization, a 1994 World Bank survey indicated that foreign investment
rose noticeably in Japan87 as did domestic research and development
spending, following recent patent reforms and harmonization.88
2. Motivation Provided by National Health Insurance
As previously noted, Japan's elderly population is growing faster than
that of almost any developed country.89  While the pharmaceutical
companies are eager to have such an elderly population as customers, the
'o EC, U.S. and Japan Sign Commitment to Standardize Pharmaceutical Tests, 8 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1702 (Nov. 20, 1991), available in Westlaw, BNA-ITR Database.
" Brian C. Cunningham & Joyce C. Chow, The Biotechnology Industry in Japan: A Framework for
Entry, 4(7) J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 13, 14 (July 1992).
82 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 85.
83 Ethical drugs are those drugs which are intended to be used or prescribed by physicians or
dentists. See, e.g., STANDARDS & CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS CONCERNING DRUGS IN JAPAN 31,
(Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Health and Welfare ed., 1988).
84 Cunningham, supra note 81, at 14.
85 Id.
" Teresa P. Buono, Biotechnology-Derived Pharmaceuticals: Harmonizing Regional Regulations,
18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 133, 134-135 (1995).
8 Suresh Koshy, The Effect of TRIPS on Indian Patent Law: A Pharmaceutical Industry
Perspective, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4, 51 (1995).
88 Finance: Foreign Investment May be Related to Patent Protection, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar.
15, 1994, available in LEXIS, Market Library, IACNWS File.
89 Takeshi Nakanishi & Shinya Mori, Insurance Claim Cap Seen Boosting Generic Drugs; Health
Ministry Keen to Limit Cost of Society's Graying, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Aug. 16, 1993, at 9.
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Ministry of Health and Welfare ("MHW") is fretting over the expected
increase in insurance claims.90 As is the case with other major industries of
Japan, the Japanese government, primarily through the MHW, has played an
important role in the development and growth of the pharmaceutical
industry by working closely with the industry to effectuate its goals. 9' The
MHW is similar to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 92
Among its several divisions are the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau, which
regulates drug approval, and the Health Insurance Bureau, which sets drug
prices.93  The Central Social Insurance Medical Council (Chuikyo),
organized under the MHW, is also integral to the functioning of the Health
Insurance Bureau. The Chuikyo makes recommendations to the MHW on
prices and prospective listings in the National Health Insurance ("NHI")
reimbursement price list.94
A major goal of the October 1996 meetings of the Chuikyo was to
simplify and rationalize the NHI pricing system.95  This simplification
involves more aggressive pricing and promotion of generic equivalents of
name-brand drugs.9 6  Currently, the government insurance program is
spending significant sums of money on name-brand drugs even though the
patents have expired and generic versions are available in other countries at
much lower prices. Hostility toward generic drugs is evidenced by the
relative weak market share of generics in Japan. 97 Compared to the United
States where generic drugs currently hold a forty percent market share,
generics in Japan only account for eight percent of the total drugs
prescribed.98 If the cost savings of using generic drugs in the United States
is any indication, then changing Japan's current law to allow generic drug
manufacturers to gain a market foothold would help in reducing the overall
price tag of national insurance. 99  The MHW, while adopting these
recommendations, wants also to encourage innovation by mandating price
90 Id.
" Cunningham, supra note 81, at 13.
9' DRUG REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS IN JAPAN 7 (3rd ed. 1988).
9' id. at 193.
94 Chuikyo Gears Up For Complex Decisions, COMLINE DAILY NEWS BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 8, 1996, available in westlaw at 1996 WL 8002450.
95 Id.
96 id.
'" Assessing the Worldwide Market for Generics, MARKET LETTER, Oct. 28, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Market Library, PROMT File.
9 Id.
99 Susana Antunes, Drug Stocks Find it Hard to Stay on Top, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE,
July 27, 1991 (Money Report), available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, IHT File.
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reductions in generics while allowing high premiums on new innovative
drugs during the first few years of their life. 00 The typical pricing of a new
generic is eighty percent of the name-brand drug.'' However, if more than
twenty generics are available for a particular drug, then these generics are
priced at ninety percent of the original. Still a third type of pricing exists to
motivate generic manufacturers to experiment with old drugs. This third
type of pricing allows the Ministry to set a premium price for a new generic
that has expanded usefulness, such as an improved dosage form or an
improved combination.'0 2 The effectiveness of this Ministry plan may be
significantly impaired due to the Nagoya District Court ruling finding
clinical trials constitute patent infringement.
0 3
Further evidence of the MI-LW embracing generics is that the Ministry
is considering introducing a system to basically equalize the prices of name-
brand and generic drugs.' 4 If the MHW does introduce this system, name-
brand manufacturers would likely lose ten to twenty percent of their current
sales.'0 5 In addition, the importance of decreasing pharmaceutical costs for
the government cannot be overlooked because pharmaceuticals now
constitute approximately one-third of Japan's total health care costs.
0 6
Allowing clinical trials before the end of the patent term would allow
generic drugs to enter the marketplace as soon as possible after the expiry of
the patent.'0 7  However, without this sort of protection, generic
manufacturers will lose two to three years in delays due to regulatory
approval following patent expiration, thereby giving an additional de facto
patent extension to the patentee.'08  In order for generic drugs to gain a
foothold in the marketplace, not only must they be able to arrive on the
market soon after patent expiry, but they also must be competitively priced.
While patent extension due to regulatory delays is already available
in Japan, any further de facto extension of patent rights will all but destroy
'® Cunningham, supra note 81, at 13.
101 578 Generics Added to NHI Drug Price List, COMLINE DAILY NEWS BIOTECH. AND MED.
TECH., July 15, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, COMLNE File. See also Number ofGE NDAs
Increases Sharply to 644 this Year, COMLINE DAILY NEWS BIOTECH. AND MED. TECH., May 27, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, COMLNE File.
102 578 Generics Added to NHI Drug Price List, supra note 101.
103 Nagoya District Court Decision, supra note 6.
104 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches, supra note 7, at 9.
105 Id.
16 Id.
107 Patent Disputes Seem Unavoidable for 70 Generic Drugs, supra note 71.
LOS Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches, supra note 7, at 9.
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the ability to have available reasonably priced generics.' 9 The reasons for
this are purely economic, for just as name-brand manufacturers must
calculate the potential commercial benefits of proceeding with drug
development, generic drug manufacturers must weigh the costs of
production and market entry against the potential commercial gain of the
remaining market life of the drug."' In many cases generic marketability
will be so delayed that the costs of marketing and regulatory approval will
outweigh any possible return in sales revenue."' In this regard, the Nagoya
District Court ruling contravenes the goals of the MHW in enabling a
supply of reduced-cost pharmaceuticals."' There is little doubt that if such
a ruling were to remain the law, generic manufacturers would have
diminished incentives to enter the market.
3. Motivation Provided by the Generic Industry Itself
The eagerness of the Japanese government to keep the pharmaceutical
market competitive is evidenced by the decision of the MH-lW to continually
list generics on the NIl, but not to impose too severe price reductions on
the generics to promote their manufacture." 3  To facilitate generic
introduction, the government must minimize the time to market for a
generic following name-brand drug patent expiration. The generic
manufacturers will no doubt emphasize this fact. Additionally, the generic
drug manufacturers of Japan are not going to sit still in this adversity. As
Itsuro Yoshida, senior managing director of Towa Pharmaceutical Company
stated, "There are court decisions to allow clinical development before the
expiration of patents in the U.S. and Germany. We will point that out in the
court."
114
The generic manufacturers' organization, Iyakkyo, feels that the
MHW is on its side when it comes to the experimental use exception."'
Generic drug manufacturers cite the fact that during its 1993 report the
MHW, in the first general administrative recognition of generic drug
importance, noted that generic drugs play a significant role in the nation's
109 Wheaton, supra note 5, at 471.
110 Id. at 470.
M Id. at 471.
112 Nagoya District Court Decision, supra note 6.
113 Number of GE NDAs Increases Sharply to 644 This Year, supra note 101.
114 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches, supra note 7, at 9.
115 Id.
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health-care system.' 16  The panel for the Ministry noted that securing a
supply of low-cost generic drugs will reduce the burden on a national
health-care system faced with soaring costs."' Furthermore, the Ministry is
testing a method to combat the over-prescription of drugs by utilizing a
fixed pricing system for reimbursing doctors." 
8
Currently, unlike in the United States, Japanese pharmaceutical
companies sell directly to doctors and hospitals who then dispense the drugs
to their patients." 9 This procedure creates an obvious problem in a system
where a government-run insurance program reimburses doctors and
hospitals for the pharmaceuticals at a fixed government price (NHI listing
price). 2 °  This problem is further exacerbated by drug companies'
discounting the price to physicians. 2 ' This creates not only the moral
dilemma that physicians over-prescribe to make a profit by way of
government reimbursement payments, but also the level of discount is
weighed in as a factor by the MHW when it does yearly reviews to reduce
prices; the bigger the average discount, the greater the price cut."' This
creates a vicious cycle of severe discounting for generics whose prices are
dependent on name-brand drug pricing (e.g., the typical generic is set at
eighty percent of the name-brand price).' By continually attempting to
undercut the price of the name-brand drug, the generics in this cycle are
eventually driven from the market.'24 This problem can be partially
alleviated by allowing earlier market entrance when the name-brand drug
price is still relatively high, thus allowing the generic producer to make a
substantial profit before discounting diminishes profits. 25  The MHW is
also implementing ceiling mechanisms at some hospitals specializing in
geriatric care. 126 This system results in a reimbursement on a nonfixed fee
basis, which gives an incentive to choose the cheaper drug (generic) in
116 Id.
17 Id. See also Takeshi Nakanishi, supra note 89.
Hs Jason James, Monday Briefing: Generic Drug Makers Face Uphill Struggle, THE DAILY
YoMIuaI (JAPAN), July 17, 1995, at 4, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, YOMIUR File. See also
Cunningham, supra note 9, at 13.
119 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 86.
120 Cunningham, supra note 9, at 13.
121 Id. See also James, supra note 118, at 4.
122 James, supra note 118, at 4.
121 Number of GE NDAs Increases Sharply to 644 This Year, supra note 101.
124 James, supra note 118, at 4.
125 Id.
126 Takeshi Nakanishi, supra note 89, at 9.
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absolute terms, regardless of discount. 127  Under this reimbursement
scenario, the prescribing entity receives no profit for prescribing the drug;
rather it is reimbursed for the actual amount paid for the drug, thus favoring
the cheaper generic drugs.
The involvement with which the MHW has undertaken to minimize
drug costs seems to indicate that the Ministry's stance on the issue of an
experimental use exception for clinical trials would be a rule which favored
generic drug manufacturers. A move that further indicates the intent of the
MHW to favor generics was the introduction this year of a new system
which inflicts additional price cuts on name-brand drugs experiencing
greater than expected sales growth. 128 This move toward favoring generics
appears to be an action by the MHW to foster further growth in original
research leading to newly patentable drugs.129 This "tough love" approach
to domestic industries is relatively new to Japan, prompting one industry
observer to say that "these drastic changes suggest an end to the cozy
relationship between industry and government, and a move toward a greater
transparency."1
30
B. Disadvantages to Changing the Current Law
If the recent Nagoya District Court decision is a pronouncement of
the current law on experimental use in Japan, then the disadvantages of
changing the status quo are few.' 3' One disadvantage of allowing
experimental use during the patent term is that this use diminishes the
property right vested in the patent holder. In addition, with the traditionally
long patent pendency times in Japan, the additional time it takes for a
generic company to test a drug after patent expiration only gives the original
patent owner a length of protection approaching that granted to other
patentees who do not have to meet regulatory approval. 32  A second
disadvantage is that traditionally the government of Japan has worked
closely to promote industry, and endorsing a change in the law to allow
generic drug competition early may undermine the domestic pharmaceutical
127 James, supra note 118, at 4.
128 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches, supra note 7, at 9.
129 James, supra note 118, at 4.
130 Japan's Drug Approval System to be Reformed, supra note 8.
'3' Nagoya District Court Decision, supra note 6.
132 Mark S. Cohen, Japanese Patent Law and the WIPO Patent Law Harmonization Treaty: A
Comparative Analysis, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA& ENT. L.J. 847, 870 (1994).
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industry. However, with the United States and the European Community
leading the way in pharmaceutical research, maybe Japan would rather
embrace a fledgling generic industry; additionally, the government may
have in mind an agenda to compete in a more head-to-head fashion with the
United States and the European Community in areas of pharmaceutical
innovation. 13
3
1. Competition as a Driving Force for Maintaining the Status Quo
What the Japanese government has in mind is difficult to anticipate
without a further understanding of the political undercurrents of Japan. But
what is known about recent government agency pronouncements is that the
MEW has expanded the use of set pricing for geriatric hospitals
reimbursement for drugs and has been influenced by the cost advantage to
the national insurance programs of embracing generic pharmaceuticals.
This has caused generic drug company officials to believe that the MIHW is
on their side of the current battle between generic and name-brand
manufacturers.' 34 Alternatively, industry experts have noted that to have a
competitive advantage in the global pharmaceutical market ultimately
depends on maintaining a constant supply of new drugs that are
differentiated and offer real cost benefits.'35 This prospect can be more
easily realized by a domestic system that fosters longer protection in order
for the name-brand drug company to maintain increased revenues for
further research and development.'36 These concerns inevitably lead to the
conclusion that the Japanese government must balance protectionism of the
domestic market while also realizing that pharmaceutical production is a
global industry requiring harmonized regulations for effective foreign
investment.
133 Poh-Lin Yeoh, Speed to Global Markets: An Empirical Prediction of New Product Success in
the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry, 28 EUR. J. MKTG. 29 (1994).
134 Patent Troubles Give Drug Firms Headaches, supra note 7, at 9. See also Takeshi Nakanishi,
supra note 89; Cunningham, supra note 9, at 13.
'35 Poh-Lin Yeoh, supra note 133, at 31.
16 Jordan P. Karp, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2180 (1991).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
2. Full Patent Term Realization and Patent Law Consistency
While diminishing the vested rights of a patent holder by allowing
experimental use during the patent term, Japan has arguably offset this loss
to the patent holder by allowing patent extension for regulatory delays.
However, the problem lies in the fact that the granting of a Japanese patent
is a rights confirming act, not a contract between society and the patent
holder as in the United States.137 From this perspective, any allowance of
use during the confirmed patent term may be rightly viewed as
infringement. Supporting this argument are the traditionally long pendency
times before a patent issues in Japan (six to seven years was not
uncommon). 13  Long pendency periods combined with patent terms
running from the application date, there is no wonder industry
representatives want patent term extension laws to remain as is. Under the
current system they not only get the patent term plus the extension term but
also a de facto market exclusivity period of two to three years while generic
firms conduct trials after the patent expires. Moreover, further protection
was called for based on the expected market loss after a generic
pharmaceutical hits the market. Currently, market price loss due to generic
competition in the first year can be as high as seventy percent, but generally
hovers around twenty percent. 139  However, the fact that the length of
overall protection in Japan, including the extension period, creates a market
exclusion of eighteen years indicates that with many products very little
effective life will remain and not many companies will choose to go to the
expense of creating a generic substitute for an obsolete medicine. 40
Additionally, it must be reiterated that Japanese law does allow
experimental use in some form under section 69(1), which states that the
effect of the patent right shall not extend to the working of the patented
invention for the purpose of experiment or research. One commentator has
noted that "[e]xperiment and study using a patented invention is hence not
forbidden and pre-patent expiration activities conducted in order to obtain
137 Cohen, supra note 132, at 849.
139 Lesavich, supra note 10, at 168. See also M. Brendan Chatham, Note, The Impact of the
'Technology Transfer Surplus' on the Trade Deficit with Japan and Its Cures, 25 GA. J. INT'L COMP. L.
561, 591 (1996) (discussing how the JPO has reduced the pendency time to 36 months with 19 months
remaining the U.S. average).
139 Polastro, Emico T., Generics Moving Ahead: The Emergence of a Pan-European Supply
System and the Introduction of US.-Style Product Discounts are Shaping the European Generics Market,
248 (23) CHEM MKTG. REP. SR6, (1995).
140 Mazer, supra note 27, at 574.
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data for submission to a government regulatory agency will not constitute
infringement as being of a non-commercial or at least pre-commercial
character."'' This analysis, however, does not agree with the Tokyo
District Court's view of section 69(1) in the Monsanto case. The court
pointed out that data for regulatory approval is absolutely commercial in
character because there is no other purpose.'42 The commentator, however,
goes on to state that "[a]lthough Japanese law does not explicitly demand
the non-commercial character of these activities this precondition can be
concluded from the context."' 143 The tension in these two statements comes
down to what is considered commercial in character. If the Monsanto case
and the recent Nagoya District Court case are an indication of the law in
Japan, then experimental use to improve a product may be allowed, but
experimental use for the sole purpose of meeting the same regulatory
requirements as the patented product does not advance technology to the
next stage as required for experimental use protection. 144
3. Political Reasons for Maintaining the Current Law
One of the most influential arguments set forth for not allowing an
expanded definition of experimental use is that allowing such use actually
decreases innovation. 45  If decreased innovation would occur in the
pharmaceutical industry as a result of expanding the experimental use
exception, then this would act as a very strong disincentive to change the
law. Not only would experimental use have a disparate impact on smaller
pharmaceutical firms, it would dissuade inventors from using patent law to
protect their ideas, thus reducing public disclosure. 146 The disclosure aspect
of the patent system is important for Japan, as industries rely on each other
for the most current technology. Additionally, Japanese companies are
relying more heavily on cross licensing technologies in order to gain a
greater global market."' 7 With an expanded experimental use doctrine, there
will be little incentive to license in order to improve upon or create a
141 Willem A. Hoyng & Florika Fink-Hooijer, The Patent Term of Pharmaceuticals and the Legal
Possibilities oflts Extension, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT 161, 173 (1990).
142 Parker, supra note 35, at 653.
143 Hoyng, supra note 141, at 173.
I" Parker, supra note 35, at 653.
145 Karp, supra note 136, at 2183.
146 Karp, supra note 136, at 2183.
147 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 86.
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generic alternative, for a competitor could just use the patented article
without paying the patentee." 8
Another effect of changing the current law would be to increase the
newly developing tension between the government and industry. In Japan
the government and industry have historically worked as a unit. 49 In fact,
as noted earlier, the patent system in Japan is expressly set up to promote
industry. Continuing to disallow the experimental use of drugs in Japan
allows larger Japanese chemical and pharmaceutical companies a selective
advantage over smaller companies. 50  Only the companies with the
resources to conduct foreign clinical trials for a generic equivalent could
effectively enter the market rapidly at the end of the patent term. Whether
the government of Japan wants to reinforce this system is unclear. As noted
previously, there has been a push in Japan to reform its pharmaceutical
regulatory guidelines as well as the insurance system.' 51
IV. JAPAN'S LIKELY CHOICE
To understand whether Japan will change the law as it exists or
merely maintain the status quo, one must first understand, at least in a
limited manner, the way in which law functions in Japan. As Professor
John Haley has stated, "[b]asic to any understanding of the role of law in
Japanese society is its limited function."'' 5  Japan is a society built more on
social restraints than law. 53 Societal censure has a great coercive impact, as
would be expected of a society of such homogeneity and cohesion as Japan.
For contracts and industry too, social restraints of the marketplace provide
mechanisms for enforcement. 54 As Professor Haley notes, "Legal rules
serve as tatemae, guiding principles, and as such relate directly to the
development of social or political consensus.' As tatemae, even
unenforced law is significant, for it acts as a policy or guiding principle for
149 Karp, supra note 136, at 2183.
149 Ken Duck, Now that the Fog has Lifted- The Impact of Japan's Administrative Procedures Law
on the Regulation ofIndustry and Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1686, 1687 (1996).
150 GILAT, supra note 4, at 8.
151 Japan's Drug Approval System to be Reformed, supra note 8. See also Kanusky, supra note 73,
at 704; Cunningham, supra note 81, at 13.
152 John 0. Haley, Introduction: Legal vs. Social Controls, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES I (John 0. Haley ed., 1988).
153 Id at 2.
154 Id.
155 Id. at4.
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a way of interacting with others."' 5 6 But the question remains, what is the
current law in relation to experimental use? Is it as the Nagoya District
Court has stated or is it something else? Will the Diet act to change the
latest ruling?
A. Likelihood of Change Through Judicial Review
The fact that the Nagoya District Court's ruling comes in a civil law
country seems to indicate that it should be taken as nonprecedential. Even
some generic industry representatives in Japan stated that the ruling was just
a judicial precedent and could not be generally accepted. 57 It is usually
taken as true that in most civil law countries the judge is merely limited to
interpreting the codes.'58 However, while Japan is a civil law country, there
seems to be some precedential effect in court decisions.'59 This precedential
effect has been attributed to the "career" system for judges which inevitably
leads to de facto following of upper court decisions by the judges of the
lower courts. The undeniable judicial activism which occurs in Japan can
be seen clearly in the area of labor law, where "[c]ompanies are deeply
aware of the importance of judicial decisions."'' 60  As Professor Haley has
stated, "[t]he courts plow the field, and the legislature freezes it.' 6' This
sentiment is echoed by Hideo Tanaka, "It seems to be undeniable that the
Japanese courts have played a very important role in the making of the law
through their 'interpretation' of statutes .... Today, analysis of cases is an
indispensable part of legal scholarship."'62
Therefore, it seems that, as in the United States, a higher court need
not hold as precedent a lower court's holding. This premise is implied from
the Court Organization Law (Saibansho-h6) (Law No. 59, April 16, 1947)
which states under article 4 that "a conclusion in a decision of a superior
156 Id. at 5.
157 Patent Disputes Seem Unavoidable for 70 Generic Drugs, supra note 71.
159 Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: Activism in the Service of
-Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 636 (1996).
159 Id. at 637. See also Leon Wolff, The What, Where, Why and How of Japanese Cases: Through
the Window of Japan's Emerging Law against Sexual Harassment 13-16 (1996) (unpublished independent
study essay, University of Washington School of Law) (on file with the University of Washington Law
Library).
160 Foote, supra note 158, at 683.
161 Andrew Marcuse, Why Japan's New Products Liability Law Isn't, 5 PAC. RIM LAW & POL. J.
365, 366 n.8 (1996).
162 HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 143 (9th printing, 1994).
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court shall bind courts below in respect of the case concerned."'' 63 The
negative implication being that superior court holdings are binding on lower
courts only in the same case and not in similar future cases. 164 But, the
practice is that in similar cases, upper court case decisions are
"substantially" binding on the lower courts. 65 Additionally, the courts in
Japan will follow their own past decisions, only overruling precedents for
strong reasons. 166 There also exists strong inferences in the procedural
aspects of Japanese law to support the premise of binding precedents. For
example, in the Code of Civil Procedure, article 394 states: "Re-appeal may
be made only on the grounds that the judgment attacked is in contravention
of law or ordinance [h6rei]."' 67 As with most codes, what article 394 means
is up to court interpretation. An appropriate question is whether a case
decision is law within the meaning of "law and ordinance" (h6rei)."6 ' This
question has been answered in the affirmative by both Japanese courts and
scholarly writers. 169  As Professor Haley puts it, "[T]he well informed
Japanese lawyer if asked whether case precedents are law in Japan will say,
'Substantially, yes; but formally, no."'' While the case for experimental
use of generic pharmaceuticals has yet to reach a High Court one can only
speculate as to the result if it does.
Moreover, the precedential weight of Monsanto Co. v. Stauffer Japan
KK. may have minimal effect on more recent decisions. Since the
Monsanto case was only a Tokyo District Court decision, the precedential
effect in any other district court will be minimal. 7 ' Therefore, while
instructive to industry on how one of the major district courts in Japan
views the matter of experimental use for regulatory purposes, the decision
will likely carry little weight except in the Tokyo District Court itself.
However, as in the United States, whenever one court visits a matter of
some importance, other courts will typically look to the reasoning of those
courts who have dealt with this matter. As previously mentioned, it can not
163 LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 494 (John 0. Haley & Dan Fenno Henderson eds.,
1987) (unpublished materials assembled for use by students in an introductory course on Japanese Law)
(on file with the University of Washington Law Library).
164 Id.
165 Id.
16 Id. at 495.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 497.
170 Id. at 494.
171 Judgment of Tokyo District Court, 29th Civil Division, reported in 20 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP.
& CopyRIGHT 91 (1989).
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go unnoticed that the Monsanto case in Japan was decided by similar
reasoning as that found in the German Monsanto case, 7 2 lending further
support to the notion that the new German policy pronounced in Klinische
Versuche 7 3 may lead to a 180 degree judicial turnaround as to the
interpretation of experimental use.
The activism of the judiciary in similar areas of vague policy
pronouncements and the regularity with which the courts in Japan look to
the German model in patent issues lead to the conclusion that judicial
review is a likely vehicle for effectuating a change in the current law.'74
The holding of Klinische Versuche,'75 if it stands, will likely have the
consequence of motivating the Japanese judiciary to accept an experimental
use exception for generic pharmaceuticals. 7 6 Moreover, the dynamics of a
changing economy in Japan and the recognition of a world economy may
force the judiciary of Japan to do as the foreigners do and make room for
some form of pharmaceutical experimental use. With the influence of
German case law on the issue as well as the need for consistency between
the industrialized nations weighing on the Japanese judiciary's minds,
Itsuro Yoshida, senior managing director of Towa Pharmaceuticals, the
largest generic-drug maker in Japan has stated that his company will point
out to the court that in the United States and Germany such clinical testing
is allowed. 17
B. Changing the Law by Action in the Diet
To fully understand the plausibility of a legislative change effectuated
by an action of the Diet requires at least a minimal understanding of the
legislative process of Japan. Like the United States, the Japanese
government has a similar separation of powers consisting of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. 78  Of these, the Diet is clearly the
72 Judgment of the German Dtlsseldorf District Court, reported in 18 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT 407 (1987).
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legislative branch, while the courts are obviously the judicial branch, but
what constitutes the executive branch is not as clear. The Constitution of
Japan adopts a parliamentary system for the national government, which
provides for a system wherein the Prime Minister (Naikaku Sori-daijin) is
designated as the head of the Executive Cabinet by the Diet.' Under the
Cabinet are the Prime Minister's office, the twelve statutory ministries,
eight commissions, and twenty-four agencies.' The legislative process is
heavily skewed toward legislative introduction by the Cabinet'' in which
individual ministries (e.g., MHW) formulate their own agenda in order to be
consistent with the Cabinet as a whole. 82
The ministry with the most interest in the law regarding experimental
use is obviously the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which creates the
pharmaceutical regulations and controls many aspects of the national health
insurance.5 3  One of the main sources of impetus behind new bills are
questions raised in the course of routine work.'84 What this means is that
many ideas for new bills come from a ministry identifying a problem
through learning how the existing law affects its operations and goals for
the future. This type of information can come from regional bodies which
are charged with the actual enforcement of the law and from learning how
the existing law is presently applied by the judiciary. 85 The importance ofjudicial interpretation of laws can thus form an important source of
information from which a ministry can work to create new legislation to
more closely tailor the law to the ministry's goals.
For the MHW to succeed in changing the law, it must perform a
precarious balancing act. Japan's regulatory system, like many areas of
Japanese culture, works by emphasizing close, informal contacts between
House of Councillors with a two-thirds majority in the case of a bill passage and with a simple majority in
the case of a budget or treaty approval. TANAKA, supra note 162, at 38.
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the ministries and those whom they regulate. 86 As one commentator has
noted, "[t]he close ties between the public and private sectors unite the
interests of government and business, and portend harmful results for
companies that challenge or ignore an agency's guidance."' 87 The close ties
between government agencies and those they regulate .is represented by the
amakudari system and could represent the largest impediment in changing
the experimental use laws.'88 In many industries, the businessmen who deal
with the ministries are themselves retired bureaucrats from those same
agencies.'89 However, recently there has been new emphasis on procedure
in these agencies and a move to dismantle the old amakudari system.'
90
The move to dismantle the amakudari system was prompted by
several incidences of impropriety, including a scandal involving the
Ministry of Finance and Japan's jfisen, or housing loan companies.' 9'
Corruption scandals alone may not speed change, but these problems,
combined with the economic situation of Japan, may.192 The unpredictable
regulatory regime of Japan has induced many pharmaceutical companies to
move their main manufacturing plants to other Asian countries.'9 3 Thus, the
Japanese Diet, through the ministries, has acted "to stem the tide of
financial and manufacturing corporations shifting their operations out of
Japan by improving the transparency of the bureaucratic process."'
194
However, the close relationship between government and industry will
surely die a slow death. 95 The close ties with industry are being pulled in
opposite directions by the generic industry and those who manufacture
name-brand pharmaceuticals. However, now it appears that the generic
industry now has more support from the MHW.
The change in the law urged by the generic industry through the
generic manufacturers' organization, Iyakkyo, has support in both the
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MHW's goals of reducing heath care as well as promoting more harmonized
regulations. 196 The rising domestic health care expenditures, as well as
foreign domination of major therapeutic markets, is forcing Japanese
pharmaceutical companies to seek more global involvement.'97 As the
Japanese firms seek internationalization, they typically seek a collaboration
with a domestic company in the foreign country of interest. Historically
these firms are highly reluctant to form collaborations with nations whose
laws do not provide similar patent protection.'9 In this regard, a ban on
experimental use may seem to be an advantage for a foreign company to
collaborate with a Japanese company. But, the global call for
harmonization, as well as rising health care costs, will likely drive the
MHW to propose allowing experimental use.
Along with the enactment of the new Administrative Procedures Law
in 1993,199 other "recent developments portend a potentially fundamental
shift in the Japanese legal environment., 200 This shift is a move to create
greater transparency between the government and industry.20 ' One such
instance of this change occurred in fall of 1996 when the MIW abolished
the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau ("PAB"). 20 2 The PAB's downfall was
orchestrated by the amakudari system itself. By allowing the PAB to
proceed with the dual functions of overseeing drug safety and also
promoting the pharmaceutical industry, the Ministry created a disasterous
mix. That disaster finally did happen when over 1,800 hemophiliacs
became infected by HIV due to slack procedures and payoffs which allowed
importation of non-heat-treated blood products to be used for
transfusions. 2 3  This incident was the main source of MHW's move to
distance themselves from industry. One industry insider was noted as
saying that "these drastic changes suggest an end to the cozy relationship
between industry and government, and a move toward greater
transparency. "204
If truly this is the downfall of the amakudari system, then there is a
strong likelihood that the MHW will suggest a change in the law to allow
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experimental use. Only the history of strong government support for
industry likely stopped the MHW from instituting such a change before
now. With the increased strength of the generic industry in Japan, as well
as the decreased role industry will likely play in the policies of the MHW,
combined with the need for lowering health care costs, the result is that the
MHW is nearly required to accept the task of changing the law. The MHW
can effectively lower one-third the cost of the national healthcare system by
reducing pharmaceutical prices.2"5 This goal can be met while still allowing
for a perfunctory recognition of the amakudari system. For the Ministry
still may be reluctant to mandate that pharmaceutical firms implement
severe price cuts on pharmaceuticals, which it has the power to do, and
instead may feel more comfortable allowing earlier entry to the generic
drugs while relying on generic drug entry as the reason for the price cuts.
Additionally, the MHW will likely continue its pricing strategy on patented
drugs, thus allowing for significant returns for pharmaceutical companies
before generic entry.20 6  Moreover, the MI-W is not likely to lend a
sympathetic ear to an industry that basically wants the right to charge the
government more for pharmaceuticals for an additional two to three years
on top of the original patent grant. Therefore, the most likely source of
change in the area of experimental use will be the MHW, guided primarily
to its decision by simple economics.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether experimental use of patented pharmaceuticals
is right for Japan, Japan nonetheless must give generic manufacturers some
means of entering the market at patent expiration. Without generic drugs,
the government of Japan faces a daunting task of paying more and more
every year as the populace of Japan ages. While the government could
effectively set a much lower price for pharmaceuticals, it has so far been
reluctant to act so brazenly against strong industry pressure. A more likely
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route for the MHW is to allow generic pharmaceuticals access to the market
early enough to induce generic firms to commit to expanding and producing
more low-cost drugs. The net result of earlier generic firm entry will
require the name-brand drug makers to either follow suit or lose substantial
market share. On the other hand, this does not alleviate the problem of the
name-brand industry charging a very high price during the monopoly
period. This too must be addressed to decrease healthcare costs for MHW.
A compromise between the name-brand and generic firms is therefore
necessary to keep the government from spending large sums of money on
drugs that could be more cheaply produced and also to keep the name-brand
pharmaceutical industry of Japan globally competitive.
The recent moves of the Japanese government to distance themselves
from industry suggest that the MIHW will propose a change to the existing
law. However, with the number of suits pending on this issue in Japan, a
High Court or possibly the Supreme Court may change the law before any
action is taken by the legislature. One must ask what right do the name-
brand pharmaceutical companies have to extend their patent right beyond
the patent itself? Conversely, what right does a competitor have to be
exempted from infringing activity, when what they are doing is preparing to
commercially exploit a currently patented product? In all other fields where
no regulatory approval is needed, no experimental marketing is allowed; so
why should something similar be allowed in pharmaceuticals?
The answer to these tangled questions seems to be resolved by the
SPC system of Europe. By allowing market exclusivity, but no other rights,
the SPC system avoids the problems of experimental use being a loss of a
patent holders' right to exclude. To fully embrace a system similar to the
SPC system, the common practice must be for most drugs to receive SPC
protection or go off patent early enough to allow effective generic
competition to take place. Problems due to lack of harmonization of patent
laws, as well as regulatory guidelines, cause serious problems for countries
seeking foreign investment. With the economy of Japan relatively slow
compared to the eighties, only positive foreign investment and foreign
collaborations will ease the pain. But, when patent laws are perceived as
weak or different, investment suffers. When speaking on Japan's patent law
on this very point, Douglas McCormick stated:
A rosy glow has long suffused our vision of biotechnology in
Japan: government support, public acceptance, highly
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motivated researchers, the happy reports of American research
executives with joint development agreements-it sounded
ideal, a model and a challenge. So it was a shock to discover ...
that the country may not be the land of tPA2 °7 milk and
recombinant2 .8 honey.20 9
As Japan moves toward greater transparency between industry and
government, this perception will no doubt change. Harmonizing the
experimental use law of Japan with that of the other major pharmaceutical-
producing nations is an effective first step.
207 tPA is short for Tissue Plasminogen Activator a known biotechnologically produced molecule
useful for facilitating the dissolution of blood clots and currently sold and manufactured by Genentech, Inc.
208 Recombinant proteins are those which are produced by genetic manipulation, usually by placing
the gene of interest into the appropriate expression vector for product expression. See generally, JAMES D.
WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE (4th ed. 1987).
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